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MOVING TOWARD PERSONALIZED LAW
Cary Coglianese*
Part 121 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides rules
for operating commercial air transportation services. Section 121.383(e) of this
part states, without equivocation, that “[n]o pilot may serve as a pilot in
operations under this part if that person has reached his or her 65th birthday.”1
The purpose behind this age restriction should be intuitive. Among
other things, the risks of sudden debilitating health incidents, like heart attacks,
increase with age, which thereby increases the safety risks to passengers on
commercial aircraft. Yet, nothing magically transformative occurs to pilots on
the very day of their sixty-fifth birthday that makes the risks they pose to the
flying public different than they were on the day before. Moreover, older
pilots’ experience might well enable them to handle aircraft more safely than
younger pilots. It was, after all, the flying experience that came with his
advanced age that allowed pilot Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger in 2009 to land
his U.S. Airways jetliner safely on the Hudson River after bird strikes had
knocked out power to both of the plane’s engines.2
But rules are, after all, rules. They draw lines. Just as with the age
limitations on airline pilots, rules make generalizations that aim to serve
lawmakers’ goals in the aggregate, that are ineffectual, perverse, or
counterproductive.3 That is the concern that motivates Professors Omri BenShahar and Ariel Porat’s book, Personalized Law: Different Rules for Different
People. Their book starts with the important recognition of the limitations of
general rules and then paints a hopeful vision for a future that overcomes these
limitations through algorithmic systems that lead to individualized
determinations based on the goals of the law.
Cary Coglianese is the Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Director of the Penn Program
on Regulation at the University of Pennsylvania. This essay is forthcoming in the University
of Chicago Law Review Online.
1 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(e).
2 Sullenberger was, at the time, about a week shy of his fifty-eighth birthday—which was itself
near what had then been the longstanding maximum age limit for commercial pilots of sixty.
Back then, federal regulations specified a limitation of age sixty on commercial pilots (although
a statute adopted two years earlier had raised the limit to age sixty-five). After Sullenberger’s
successful landing, the U.S. Department of Transportation amended its regulations to reflect
the extended age limit. The U.S. Governmental Accountability Office has failed to find
evidence to indicate that safety risks to the flying public have increased with the extension of
the retirement age. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SAFETY:
INFORMATION ON THE SAFETY EFFECTS OF MODIFYING THE AGE STANDARD FOR
COMMERCIAL PILOTS (2009), online at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-10-107r (visited
Dec. 5, 2021).
3 Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, Regulation by Generalization, 1 REG. & GOV. 68
(2007).
*

Ben-Shahar and Porat’s vision of a world with fewer general rules and
more individualized determinations is increasingly possible to view as more
than just science fiction. Advances in predictive analytic tools—that is,
machine learning or artificial intelligence—are starting to allow more precise,
individualized determinations in a variety of other settings, such as medicine
and marketing. Indeed, these same analytic tools and digital technologies
underlie the auto-pilot systems that control much of the operation of
commercial jetliners today.
With Personalized Law, Ben-Shahar and Porat offer important
commentary on a future in which the law could rely more on predictive
analytics to make personalized judgments about legal obligations.
Acknowledging that under current law “commercial airline pilots must
undergo frequent health screenings starting at age forty and retire at sixtyfive,” Ben-Shahar and Porat note that “[i]n a personalized law regime, rather
than establishing a one-for-all age threshold, these controls would be
personalized, relying also on additional factors.”4 Their vision responds to a
series of longstanding complaints about law and regulation: rules are blunt
instruments; they can be over- and under-inclusive; and the world is diverse,
making one-size rules not always fit all.5
These criticisms have generated reactions from lawmakers and
regulators who have responded to the pull of the particular, even absent the
use of advanced technologies. To take account of relevant particularities, rules
are sometimes made complex so that they can fit better the complexities found
in the world. With this kind of bespoke regulation, or obligationgerrymandering, rules weave to and fro, including some entities or
circumstances under their mandates, while carving others out.6 Rules may also
be designed to provide greater flexibility to accommodate differences by
imposing obligations to achieve or avoid outcomes, instead of taking specific
actions, thereby allowing for all individuals to select those actions that work
best for them to meet the performance designated in the rule.7 In addition, ex

OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & ARIEL PORAT, PERSONALIZED LAW: DIFFERENT RULES FOR
DIFFERENT PEOPLE at 110-111 (Oxford University Press 2021).
5 EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (Routledge 1982); PHILIP HOWARD, DEATH OF
COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (Random House 1994). For
valuable conceptual analysis, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules,
93 YALE L. J. 65 (1983); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES (Harvard University Press 2003).
6 Cary Coglianese, Gabriel Scheffler, & Daniel E. Walters, Unrules, 73 STAN L REV 885, 892
(2021).
7 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Lori S. Bennear, Flexible Approaches to Environmental Regulation,
in MICHAEL KRAFT AND SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, EDS., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Oxford University Press 2012).
4
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post obligation-alleviation mechanisms—waivers, exemptions, and variances—
allow for the tailoring of off-the-shelf obligations.
It is not hard to find examples of this particularity impulse in current
law. Federal regulations, for example, call upon public school systems to
establish an “individualized education program” for students with learning
disabilities, thus creating a set of customized rules for the delivery of these
students’ educational services.8 In the environmental regulatory context,
officials customize the emissions limits contained in pollution permits that are
individually negotiated between state officials and industrial facilities. Federal
law specifically provides for variation in the water pollution limits contained
in these permits when “factors relating to the discharger’s facilities, equipment,
[and] processes . . . are fundamentally different from the factors considered by
EPA in development of the national limits.”9 Finally, in what might be
considered the regulatory equivalent of couture, regulators in some countries
apply what is known as safety case regulation to the approval of large industrial
facilities, requiring owners to submit individualized plans for operating these
facilities safely based on their distinct characteristics and circumstances.10
Once approved by the regulator, these individualized plans become binding
law imposed on the individual facility.11
Examples like these notwithstanding, much law remains in a form akin
to Part 121 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations: namely, rules that
apply across the board, such as age limitations. With technological advances,
it is no longer fanciful to consider moving toward a system in which individual
determinations replace general rules. Surely, that would lead to more optimal
and just outcomes. For example, in the case of “an individual applying for a
governmental license—say, a prospective pilot asking the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to grant her flight certification,” instead of relying on
blunt rules about age, flight training, and the like, “the FAA might instead rely
on a machine-learning algorithm to improve the process of determining when
a pilot’s license should be granted.”12 The algorithm could comb “through all
of the available data about the applicant—say, school records, medical records,
social media postings, and fine-grained data from the flight recorders from
20 U.S.C. § 1401(14).
5 U.S.C. § 125.30.
10 See Prerna Jain, Anne M. Reese, Dushyant Chaudhari, Ray A. Mentzer & M. Sam Mannan,
Regulatory Approaches - Safety Case vs US Approach: Is There a Best Solution Today?, 46 J. LOSS
PREVENTION IN THE PROCESS INDUS. 154, 155–57 (2017).
11 In the United Kingdom, for example, offshore oil and gas facilities subject to safety case
regulation “must ensure that the procedures and arrangements described in the current
safety case which may affect the health and safety of persons or the environment are
followed.” UK HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, THE OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS
(OFFSHORE SAFETY DIRECTIVE) (SAFETY CASE ETC.) REGULATIONS 2015: GUIDANCE ON
REGULATIONS 72 (2015), https://www.hse.gov.uk/pUbns/priced/l154.pdf.
12 Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV.
1, 10 (2019).
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previous training flights flown by the applicant.”13 Then, the government
would grant the “license when the machine-learning algorithm forecasts the
applicant’s risk to be below a specified threshold.”14
Signs of movement in this direction can already be found, as cities,
states, and federal agencies start experimenting with the use of machinelearning tools. These tools are already being used to help support important
governing tasks that previously had been driven either by general rules or
human judgment.15 In the automated traffic light systems in Los Angeles and
Pittsburgh, machine learning is being used to establish, quite literally, the rules
of the road.16
But achieving a general and widespread system of legal decisions made
through machine learning remains at least decades off. Legal change of any
kind is slow and difficult to bring about, with organized interests that benefit
from the status quo working to resist reform. Among the various technological,
organizational, and political hurdles that stand in the way of a personalized
system of law, I discuss here three potential challenges, each flagged by BenShahar and Porat to varying degrees in their book. First, to work well,
personalized law seems to necessitate a complete specification of the goals
currently behind legal rules. Second, personalized law will necessitate a
sufficient level of social consensus around the precise specification of law’s
goals and how different values should be traded off against each other. Finally,
to achieve the full promise of individualized justice that delivers optimal
outcomes for society, personalized law will need to remain current with
changing values and new feeds of data. As shorthand, I refer to these as
challenges of completeness, consensus, and currency.
After briefly elaborating each of these challenges, I offer two solutions:
custom and competence. By custom, I mean that—as a sociological matter—the
public could generally accept the use of personalized law, even absent full
resolution of the challenges of completeness, consensus, and currency. By
competence, I mean that responsible efforts to achieve pragmatic improvements
in the law should help bring about public acceptance of personalized law. Both
Id.
Id.
15 Cary Coglianese & Lavi Ben Dor, AI in Adjudication and Administration, 86 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 791 (2021), DAVID ENGSTROM, DANIEL E. HO, CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, &
MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUELLAR, GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (2020), archived at https://perma.
cc/7PCS-PZRZ.
16 Ian Lovett, To Fight Gridlock, Los Angeles Synchronizes Every Red Light, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1,
2013), online at https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/us/to-fight-gridlock-los-angeles-syn
chronizes-every-red-light.html (visited Dec. 5, 2021); G. WANHOO LEE, IBM CTR. FOR THE
BUS. OF GOV’T, CREATING PUBLIC VALUE USING THE AI-DRIVEN INTERNET OF THINGS
(2021), online at https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Creating%20Public
%20Value%20using%20the%20AI-Driven%20Internet%20of%20Things.pdf.
13
14
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custom and competence might well “solve” the completeness, consensus, and
currency challenges even if we concede that these challenges can never be fully
overcome.
In other words, it is possible to acknowledge that personalized law will
never be perfect. Yet acknowledgement of its imperfection need not
undermine its appeal. After all, today’s legal system is not perfect either. It
may turn out that personalized law’s imperfections will prove acceptable to the
public in a society increasingly dependent on digital tools, especially if
personalized law performs better than the status quo that relies primarily on
general rules and human judgment.17
***
Completeness. The completeness challenge for personalized law arises
because it is goal-driven law.18 It establishes particularized legal obligations for
individuals based on what an algorithm determines would best achieve the
relevant goals given each individual’s characteristics and other factors. In
principle, this is an eminently sensible approach to law, as by definition it
eliminates the over- and under-inclusiveness of general rules. The rule’s goals
become the law of the algorithm itself, so compliance with the law necessarily
advances the relevant societal goals. The challenge, though, lies with
identifying a complete set of goals that should be operationalized in the
algorithm underlying personalized law.
Let us return to Part 121 of Title 14. The age limitation for commercial
pilots is not the goal itself, but merely a proxy for a set of goals related to the
safety of air transportation. As Ben-Shahar and Porat observe, these
limitations do not arise because society cares about age per se. Rather, these
limitations “are concerned primarily with unreasonable risks.”19 Instead of
relying on age, the government could shift to a goal-based approach that would
instead subject each pilot to an individualized screening and identify the health
risks for each, allowing individuals whose risk is below a specified level to
qualify to fly commercial aircraft regardless of their age. Although age is often
thought of as a proxy for the risks of sudden heart attacks, it is not a precise
predictor. As a result, it would be better to rely on a more data-rich analytic
tool—an algorithm—to make a more accurate prediction of heart failure. For
that reason, peer-reviewed science recommends that pilots should be screened
using “risk estimating calculators”20 or “individualized risk scoring using an

Cary Coglianese & Katelyn Hefter, From Negative to Positive AI Rights, WILLIAM & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. (forthcoming).
18 Ben-Shahar and Porat correctly observe that “[p]ersonalized law requires lawmakers to be
explicit about the goals of the law.” Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 4, at 138.
19 Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 4, at 106.
20 Ries Simons & Rene Maire, Extending the Age Limit of Commercial Pilots?, 41 EUROPEAN
HEART JOURNAL 2239, 2242 (2021).
17
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appropriately calibrated prediction algorithm”21—with “risk” in the extant
studies equating to the risk of a heart attack.
If lawmakers were to accept these recommendations and substitute an
individualized forecast of cardiovascular disease for a general age limitation,
the resulting test for pilot licenses would provide a better prediction of heart
attacks—but it would not completely capture the goals underlying the current
age limitation. Although instances of pilots becoming suddenly incapacitated
are extremely rare, no more than half of such incapacitations are due to cardiac
incidents. This means that other types of health crises, some also related to
age, present sudden incapacitation risks that would need to be included in any
individualized risk calculation. Moreover, as pilots age, they can suffer other
physical limitations that can affect their ability to fly safely, such as the
degradation of sensory perceptions, reflexes, and reaction times, or certain
cognitive impairments. None of these would be captured in a risk calculator
focused on cardiovascular health. A complete algorithm would need to take in
the panoply of health risks that might affect safe piloting. It would also, of
course, need to take into account other qualities—such as experience and
skill—that could improve safety with age.
It may seem obvious that a complete specification of the goals behind
an age requirement would need to include more than just heart attack risk. But
in practice, the complete set of goals is not always so obvious for all problems.
If we look to the history of regulation, it is not hard to find examples of the
incomplete specification of goals. Goal-based regulation, after all, is not unique
to personalized law—it even dates to the Code of Hammurabi.22 But not
infrequently, lawmakers specify a relatively simple, single-dimensional goal,
based on a salient problem at hand, only later to discover that they overlooked
other relevant goals. A few examples:
•

Since at least the passage of the Poison Prevention Packaging Act
in 1970, federal regulators sought to reduce the number of
childhood poisonings from the ingestion of medicines and
household cleaners.23 They set goal-based standards that required
companies to create product packaging that would be unable to be
opened by most children. After child-resistant packages complying
with these standards entered the marketplace, it became evident
that many adults also could not easily open the packages. Once

Hans Bauer, Dennis Nowak & Britta Herbig, Aging and Cardiometabolic Risk in European
HEMS Pilots: An Assessment of Occupational Old-Age Limits as a Regulatory Risk Management
Strategy, 38 RISK ANALYSIS 1332, 1344 (2018) (footnote omitted).
22 Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash, & Todd Olmstead, Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects
and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705, 706
(2003). See also Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, The Law of the Test: Performance-Based
Regulation and Diesel Emissions Control, 34 YALE J. REG. 33 (2017).
23 Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. ch. 39A § 1471 et seq.
21
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adults managed to open these packages, they tended to leave them
open or transferred them to non-resistant containers—creating an
increased risk of childhood poisoning. Regulators eventually
modified the regulations to incorporate a twin goal: keep children
from opening packages, while allowing adults to open them.24
•

Automobile safety regulations governing air bags are based on the
physical force imposed on crash test dummies. Initially, the
dummies specified in these tests were sized to the average adult
male. Only later did it become tragically evident that air bags
designed to meet these tests deployed too forcefully against
individuals smaller than the average male—killing occupants who
would otherwise not have been harmed in low-speed crashes.
Eventually, regulators specified a more multi-faceted regulatory
test that necessitated so-called smart air bags that could deploy
differently for different occupants.25

•

A shift to a performance-based building code in New Zealand gave
builders flexibility to make highly personalized choices about
construction materials as long as the code’s required structural
strength goals were met. Only after a vast swath of new housing
throughout the country began to experience serious mold problems
did regulators eventually realize that the building code should have
included mildew resistance goals as well as ones for structural
strength.26

Experiences such as these provide a note of caution for anyone designing
personalized law. Personalized law’s completeness challenge calls for breaking
free of tunnel-vision tendencies and ensuring a fully specified set of goals can
be incorporated into law’s algorithms.27
Consensus. Identifying a complete set of goals animating a law is only
the first challenge. If multiple values are to be incorporated into an algorithm
that generates personalized obligations, then weights and tradeoffs between
these values will need to be articulated with mathematical precision. As BenShahar and Porat point out, a system of “algorithmic directives would require
fixing the objectives of the law in advance with precision, so as to translate it
into code.”28 Yet, as Cass Sunstein observed years ago, social consensus over

Cary Coglianese, The Limits of Performance-Based Regulation, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 525
(2017).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Justice Stephen Breyer has provided an instructive account of regulators succumbing to
tunnel vision. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION (Harvard University Press 1995).
28 Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 4, at 233.
24
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values can be hard to come by.29 Due to difficulties in achieving agreement,
the law today is riddled with what Sunstein has called “incompletely theorized
agreements.” Such agreements manifest in the spongy language that populates
much of law today, through words such as reasonable, undue, feasible, and
adequate.30
Ben-Shahar and Porat point out that, under personalized law,
legislators could no longer get by with such “loose” formulations31 and instead
would need to agree to “an exact weighing of their relative importance.”32
There can be, as Ben-Shahar and Porat put it, “[n]o fudging.”33
This requirement is not difficult to meet when values are simple, clear,
and unidimensional—or when the consequences of the use of personalized
automation is de minimus. No societal consensus need be sought around the
precise values to be used, for example, in the machine-learning algorithms that
automatically read and sort postal mail.
The law can similarly rely on machine learning whenever disparate
effects or values can be easily converted into a common metric and a wellaccepted function for ranking against this metric exists. For example, the goal
behind licensing commercial airline pilots might in principle be specified in
terms of a common, single metric of accident risk. And a simple function of
“minimize accident risk” could presumably be applied. In such a case, as long
as the necessary data exist, an algorithm might account for how a pilot’s age
can both increase risks due to health limitations and decrease risks due to
greater experience.34 These risk estimates could be combined, and the
algorithm could take age and other individualized characteristics and data into
account to determine who becomes authorized to fly commercial aircraft.
But the relevant calculus will often not be so clear. If an algorithm were
used to establish individualized emissions limits for the polluting sources
affecting air quality in the Grand Canyon region, the objective function would
presumably need to consider, and make tradeoffs between, a variety of relevant
values: human health, visibility in the national park, costs to firms and
customers, impacts on the reliability of the electricity grid, and so forth.
Unfortunately, little consensus exists over the precise weighting and
relationships between these values. The same can be said of many legal and
policy issues in a pluralistic society.35 Some people even see the competing
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735 (1995).
Id.
31 Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 4, at 235.
32 Id. at 36.
33 Id. at 233.
34 See generally JOHN GRAHAM & JONATHAN WIENER, RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995).
35 Moreover, the aggregation of preferences about these values could prove unstable. Kenneth
J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328 (1950).
29
30
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values implicated by major legal questions as completely incommensurable and
thus conceptually incapable of being combined or balanced.
Throughout the law, the lack of clear social consensus will, as BenShahar and Porat observe, “make some lawmaking more difficult [in an era of
personalized law] and even impossible.”36 Ultimately, the absence of clear
consensus over values makes it evident that “[t]he necessity of well-specified
goals is a major hurdle for personalized law.”37
Currency. A system of personalized law will also need a steady supply
of data and a process for adapting to changes in individual and environmental
conditions. I consider this a “currency” challenge in two senses of the word:
data will constitute the medium or currency on which personalized law
depends, and these data need to be kept up to date.
The first currency challenge is foundational. Data are what drive
personalizing algorithms, and when data are not available, algorithmically
based personalized law is not possible. Personalized law will hold its greatest
promise with legal matters that involve repeated incidents or scenarios than
with truly sui generis situations. It is no surprise that Ben-Shahar and Porat
use driving and traffic laws as examples throughout their book.38 Driving is a
highly repeated activity for which the outcomes of principal concern—
accidents—are both frequent and well-documented. The large amount of data
on automobile driving and accidents is precisely why it is one of the most
empirically studied areas of regulation.39
Yet the legal system also operates in domains or over issues for which
data are not available. Consider the age of commercial airline pilots. It is
completely conceivable to shift to a system that relies on algorithmic forecasts
of risk for commercial pilots in an age range of, say, 30 to 65 years. But it would
be much harder, if not impossible, to conceive of a system that could produce
sufficiently reliable forecasts for commercial pilots over the age of 65. Why?
Current rules do not permit pilots to fly commercial aircraft if they are over
the age of 65, which means no data exist on commercial pilots over this age.
Even if one were to look for data on noncommercial pilots, there will be much
fewer data available on pilots the older they get, simply because there are fewer
older pilots overall. Without sufficient data, there can be no personalized law.
The second sense of currency refers to the need for the data and
algorithms underlying personalized law to remain current or up to date. Much
of what makes machine learning marvelous stems from its dynamic nature.
Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 4, at 235.
Id. at 37.
38 Id. at 1, 4, 6, 8-9, 19, 32, 62-67, 82, 106-07, 109-10, 125-26, 128, 147, 175-76, 183, 188, 19394, 201, 203, 207, 209, 215, 234-35, 237.
39 John Mendeloff, Evaluation in Two Safety Regulatory Agencies (2004), archived at https://
perma.cc/DQ5U-9RBQ.
36
37
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These algorithms are often updated on a regular basis (sometimes constantly),
and their accuracy improves as they are fed more data over time. Their
forecasts grow brittle and stale if the data upon which these algorithms train
grow out of date and conditions change. Similarly, if the objective functions in
these algorithms no longer reflect current needs or social values, then this too
will lead a system of personalized law to generate outmoded results.
A personalized system of licensing commercial airline pilots, for
example, might need new data or analysis when the technology in the airplane
itself changes.40 Perhaps new automated flying systems can compensate for
some of the perceptual limitations that come with age, which might make data
from a period before the adoption of these systems less applicable. On the
other hand, the automated systems in the cockpits of commercial aircraft may
come with more buttons, dials, and indicators that demand greater or different
cognitive skills which are possessed more frequently by younger pilots. For
these reasons, an algorithmic system to license pilots would likely need to retrain its algorithm regularly, and the outcomes generated by the system would
vary as conditions in the world (and in the data) change. As change is endemic
in the world, a personalized law system would need data to be refreshed and
algorithms revisited regularly, as Ben-Shahar and Porat acknowledge, both to
avoid “stale objectives and accommodate new circumstances and priorities.”41
Consider one recent “new circumstance” relevant to a personalized
system of driving law. Between 2019 and 2020, miles traveled by car in the
United States dropped by about 13%, while automobile fatalities increased by
about 7%—the greatest annual number of fatalities in over a decade.42 The
precise cause of this seeming anomaly can still only be speculated, but it might
include: competency deficits from less frequent driving during the COVID-19
pandemic; drivers driving at higher speeds due to less congestion during the
pandemic; or an increase in road rage due to heightened stress levels during
the pandemic. The upshot for a personalized system of traffic laws is that, if
commands were based on algorithms trained on data from a normal year, the
system could generate individualized speed limits that result in too much risk
under the changed circumstances.
***
It should be clear that despite personalized law’s alluring promise to
overcome the inefficiencies, frustrations, and injustices of general rules, the

One of the main issues with the recent fatal crashes of two Boeing 737-Max airplanes
stemmed from how their automated systems pushed the nose of the airplane down. Some
pilots knew how to respond, but the pilots of the ill-fated planes did not.
41 Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 4, at 36.
42 NHTSA Traffic Safety Facts: Early Estimates, https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/
ViewPublication/813115.
40
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three challenges I have just outlined—completeness, consensus, and currency—will
stand in the way of personalized law fulfilling its aspirations completely.
Ben-Shahar and Porat are thus right to suggest that a wholesale
transformation to personalized law will not occur any time soon. Rather, if
personalized law is to take root, it will be best to “start with small steps,” as
they recommend.43 Such small steps may already be underway, reflected in the
various ways that governments are already digitizing their operations and on
occasion relying on algorithms to support various adjudicatory and
administrative functions.44 Some countries, such as Denmark, Korea, and
Estonia, have placed a high priority on digitizing and automating many
governmental functions—establishing some of the necessary building blocks
for making a shift to personalized law.45
A shift to personalized law need not—and almost surely should not—
be made all at once. Ben-Shahar and Porat advise that change should proceed
incrementally, with personalized law adopted “in areas where the benefits of
differentiation are large, where the goals of the law are widely accepted, where
the data about the relevant interpersonal differences are reliable, and where
the distributive effects of non-uniformity are desirable.”46 This is indeed how
a transition to personalized law is likely to occur: incrementally, and perhaps
also only partially. Making any kind of non-incremental change is, after all,
exceedingly hard.47 More importantly, because the challenges I have outlined
above may well never be fully met, incremental change may serve to acclimate
the public to an imperfect (but hopefully better) personalized system of law.
Nevertheless, despite the inherent limitations, a large-scale shift to
personalized law may well eventually still occur in the decades to come. If it
does, it will be in part because of intelligent efforts to design algorithmic
systems that are defined in terms of well-considered sets of goals, with
objective functions that incorporate weights and tradeoffs that seek to
approximate prevailing moral sentiments in society, and with as much data as
can be assembled and updated feasibly. It will also be in part because of
scholarship like that of Ben-Shahar and Porat’s, along with the work of many
others (perhaps especially those more critical of the use of artificial intelligence
in the law). Critical scholarship may make the designers of these systems better
informed and more thoughtful. But even so, personalized law will never be
perfect. Its success in winning and deserving public support will derive, I
suspect, from two principal sources: custom and competence.
Custom. As the public grows increasingly accustomed to personalized,
algorithmic decisions by private actors in other spheres of their life, they will
Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 4, at 240.
See note 15 and accompanying text.
45 U.N., UNITED NATIONS E-GOVERNMENT SURVEY 2020, at 12 (2020).
46 Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 4, at 240.
47 Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
43
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likely become more accustomed to personalized law—indeed, they may well
come to demand it. Already, we have seen this kind of acclimation effect with
the so-called first stage of e-government: the building of websites and online
service tools for most government agencies. After all, as it has become possible
to order groceries and buy cars online, not to mention conduct any number of
other social and economic activities, it has become exceedingly hard for
government offices not to allow members of the public to pay their taxes or
renew their driver’s licenses online too. Much the same could be expected in
years to come of more advanced digital systems. For example, customers at
eBay who resolve a problem through the company’s automated dispute
resolution tool are reportedly more likely to return to eBay to do more business
than those customers who have no disputes at all.48 Perhaps a shift to fully
automated court proceedings will not be far off.
Similarly, although personalized law may well suffer from some degree
of incompleteness, or even seeming arbitrariness, when it comes to how
algorithms are designed, the public already tolerates a good bit of
incompleteness and incoherence in the current impersonal, rule-based legal
system. The popularity of Philip Howard’s critique of modern rule-based
governance, The Death of Common Sense (which stayed on the New York
Times bestseller list for months when it first came out in the 1990s), confirms
that the public is not blind to the perversities of the current system.49 The bar
that personalized law would need to meet is far from a high one.
The courts already tolerate a fair degree of looseness in the joints. The
rational basis test under the Constitution hardly demands any strong degree of
rationality. Statutes only need to make some surface-level sense. Moreover,
although the courts review agency-created rules under a standard that purports
to ferret out arbitrary and capricious decisions, the reality is that judicial review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard is often quite deferential—and
arguably somewhat arbitrary itself. The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, for example, can pass up on tightening standards that would save
human lives in favor of tightening standards that avoid minor illnesses.50 It is
far from clear that the courts would insist on total value completeness and
precision for personalized law algorithms, as long as the government had some
sensible-sounding rationales for their design.51
BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING JUSTICE: MORE TECHNOLOGY,
FEWER LAWYERS, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 113 (2017).
49 HOWARD, supra note 5.
50 In the 1990s, for example, judges upheld federal environmental regulators’ decision to
decline to tighten particulate matter standards in a way that would have prevented additional
fatalities, while they simultaneously tightened ozone standards even though doing so yielded
no mortality-related benefits. Cary Coglianese & Gary Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of
Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1321-23 (2004).
51 Indeed, by the logic of the Supreme Court’s decision in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v.
NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983), where the Court said that judges should be most deferential to
48
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Competence. The key is likely to be that any system of personalized law
will need to work well. If it delivers on its promise of achieving outcomes that
better advance the goals of the law than the current rule-based system, that is
likely to be enough. When credit card companies use machine learning to
identify fraudulent transactions, for example, they can do so with remarkable
speed and accuracy. Credit card customers surely have few qualms about these
personalized tools because they work so well. Much the same could be expected
if personalized law delivers outcomes widely perceived as accurate, fair, and
sensible.
Given the imperfections of the status quo, personalized law hardly
needs to be perfect; it just needs to be better.52 Can it do better? Ben-Shahar
and Porat put forward a highly plausible case that it can. Not only can
personalized law reduce the over- and under-inclusiveness of the current rulebased system, but it holds out the prospect of treating people more humanely
by recognizing their individuality and better meeting their needs. If
personalized law does deliver on the promises that Ben-Shahar and Porat
articulate, it is surely an approach to embrace. As David Lehr and I have noted
still earlier, “many aspects of public administration could undoubtedly benefit
from the application of machine-learning algorithms.”53
This is not to say that success is guaranteed. Although personalized law
depends on mathematical functions and digital technologies that hold
theoretical advantages, a system of personalized law will ultimately be
constructed by humans. And just as humans can make mistakes in establishing
rules, they can—and surely will—make mistakes in developing the information
systems upon which personalized law can be delivered. Examples of past
failures with governmental information systems are not hard to come by. The
most prominent was the fiasco experienced in rolling out HealthCare.gov
following the adoption of the Affordable Care Act. Similar recent failures in
facial recognition software, automated forensic tools, and welfare fraud
systems can also be cited.54
Yet with technology development of all kinds, failures are to be
expected early in the innovation process. Although DNA analysis has today
become an evidentiary gold standard, the early adoption of DNA analysis in
criminal law cases, it bears remembering, was met with suspicion and
disapproval by some courts.55 We should not necessarily conclude that
personalized law cannot succeed merely because governments have sometimes
agencies when they are working at the frontiers of science, governmental use of machinelearning algorithms might merit more deferential review by the courts. See Coglianese & Lehr,
supra note 12.
52 Cary Coglianese & Alicia Lai, Algorithm vs. Algorithm, 72 DUKE L. J. 1281 (2022).
53 Cary Coglianese and David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision-Making in the
Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEORGETOWN L. J. 1147, 1152-53 (2017).
54 Coglianese & Lai, supra note 52.
55 Coglianese & Hefter, supra note 17.
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failed in their deployment of information technology. The failures are much
more noticeable than the successes—and there are indeed successes to trumpet.
Consider the following:
•

Greek border officials used a machine-learning system to screen
travelers for COVID-19 infections. By using a digital algorithm,
officials identified about two to four times as many asymptomatic
travelers compared with traditional screening protocols.56

•

Only a small fraction of industrial facilities subject to federal water
pollution regulations in the United States can be inspected by
regulators in any given year. With the aid of a machine-learning
algorithm, environmental regulators can find more than seven
times the number of violators while conducting the same number
of inspections.57

•

Defendants who are released from jail pose a risk of committing
crimes while they are out on bail. If the decisions of a human judge
were substituted with a machine-learning algorithm, such post-bail
crimes could be reduced by 25 percent while maintaining the same
rate of decisions to grant bail. Such an improvement is possible
while at the same time reducing racial disparities in jailing rates.58

When a system of personalized law comes to deliver results like these more
consistently throughout the legal system, and when that demonstrated
competence is combined with greater familiarity with and public acclimation
to algorithmic personalization in other spheres of life, public acceptance of
even imperfect personalized law seems quite probable, if not even reasonably
assured.
***
Ben-Shahar and Porat’s book, Personalized Law, articulates a vision for
a more individualized, effective, and just legal system that is based on datadriven, fine-tuned legal obligations. It also articulates the challenges that
would confront a legal system transformed to deliver obligations personally
rather than in a wholesale fashion through general rules. Whether society
achieves Ben-Shahar and Porat’s hopeful vision will depend on overcoming
personalized law’s challenges—but not necessarily on overcoming them
completely. A system of personalized law need not be perfect to be normatively
appealing. All that personalized law must be is better than the imperfect
system in place today.
Hamsa Bastani, et al., Efficient and Targeted COVID-19 Border Testing Via Reinforcement
Learning, 599 NATURE 108 (2021).
57 Miyuki Hino, Elinor Benami, and Nina Brooks, Enhancing Environmental Monitoring Through
Machine Learning, 1 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 583, 583-584 (2018).
58 Jon Kleinberg, et al., Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q. J. ECON. 237 (2017).
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